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11. Introduction
The US mortgage crisis in 2007 involved serious weaknesses in assessing consumer 
credit risk. The ensuing economic effects spilled over globally and attention turned to 
consumer credit in emerging markets (Arslan and Karan, 2010). In the context of 
European emerging markets Backé and Wójcik (2008; p.458) argue that credit to the 
private sector has risen rapidly in new European Union (EU) member states and the 
recent “lending boom appears to be particularly strong in the segment of loans to 
households, primarily mortgage-based housing loans.” Unfortunately, in the recent past 
the evaluation of the credit conditions of the borrowers in the new EU members has been 
largely neglected (Grigorian and Manole, 2006) and the issue is grossly under-researched 
in these emerging markets. We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we 
construct two types of credit risk model based on logistic regression and Classification 
and Regression Trees (CART). Second, based on the retail loan banking data from the 
Czech Republic, a new EU member, we compare the efficiency of the two methods and 
identify the key determinants of default behavior. To the best of our knowledge we are 
the first to provide this type of analysis performed on real retail banking data in a post-
transformation country that is now part of the EU. 
From a solely technical perspective, the lending process is a relatively 
straightforward series of actions involving two principle parties. These actions go from 
the initial loan application to the successful repayment of the loan or its default. Since 
increases in the amount of loans also bring increases in the number of defaulted loans, the 
key problem is to differentiate between “low risk” and “high risk” debtors prior to 
granting credit. Due to the asymmetric information between the lender and borrower such 
differentiation is not a trivial task. However, as clearly shown by Dinh and Kleimeier 
(2007), if a capable model is applied and reliable data are available then credit scoring 
greatly reduces the risk (see Renault and De Servigny, 2004 for a thorough exposition of 
the credit scoring literature).1
Assessment of the retail credit default and credit scoring processes in the new EU 
member states might reflect specific issues characteristic to these counties. The key 
characteristic is the dramatically different origin of the commercial banking sector in 
these countries: before transformation it was nonexistent—it had to be built from scratch 
(Hanousek et al., 2007)—and processes that require careful monitoring of borrowers have 
been largely underestimated (Grigorian and Manole, 2006). The commercial banking sector 
2emerged in transformation economies over a long period as a result of the breakup of the 
state monobank system and the subsequent privatization of newly established banks 
combined with issuing licenses to new banks (Barisitz, 2005). Further, on the micro level 
the privatization of banks and its pace varied. For example the Czech Republic managed to 
achieve full banking privatization only by 2001 and in general the banking sector 
transformation in new EU members was a lengthy process for two main reasons. One, 
unlike firms that were part of the command economies, commercial banks emerged as a new 
segment of the two-tier system after the monobank system was abolished. Two, many 
governments have proceeded with bank privatization at a slow pace to prolong control over 
firms through credit channels provided by state-owned banks (Hanousek et al., 2007); this 
has changed only after banks were privatized via foreign direct investment. Finally, as 
transformation progressed and countries accessed the EU, the situation in the commercial 
banking sector improved gradually (see Derviz and Podpiera, 2008, for a detailed rating 
assessment of Czech banks). Hanousek et al. (2007) show that the high level of financial 
intermediation performed by banks—in particular the transformation of deposits into loans 
that entail the monitoring of borrowers and the qualitative transformation of capital—
indicates that banks play an important role in the economies of these new EU members. 
Nevertheless, during transformation the key role of the banking system was to channel funds 
to the real economy; efficiency and profitability were of secondary importance. Thus, “the 
banks were not engaged in evaluating the credit conditions of their borrowers, and therefore 
no risk management techniques were in use” (Grigorian and Manole, 2006; p. 497). 
Following the above outline we focus on analyzing the determinants of retail loan 
default in the Czech Republic, a new EU economy. In general, new EU members have 
recently recorded a sharp increase in the amount of retail loans, a move that calls for 
heightened attention to credit scoring. Hilbers et al. (2005), who review trends in private 
sector lending and focus on European emerging markets, find that the rapid growth of 
private sector credit may create a key challenge for most of these countries in the future. 
In the Czech Republic, even before its integration into the EU, the financial liabilities of 
households between 1999–2005 (a period covered by our data) increased more than twice 
(relative to GDP) and it is expected that the amount of loans to retail clientele will 
continue to increase. During the recent financial crisis, the expansion of loans temporarily 
slowed down, but in 2010 the appetite of Czech households for credit started to rise again 
(CNB, 2010). 
3In light of recent developments, we aim to build an application type of model that 
would primarily be suitable for the pre-scoring of clients. One of our goals is to look at 
the significance of socio-demographic variables as determinants of default. In this 
approach we follow Swain (2007), who highlights the importance of this type of variable 
with respect to household default risk. The reason is that this type of variable provides 
useful information in times of change. This is particularly true in new EU members that 
recently underwent an unprecedented economic transformation and have integrated into 
the EU. Socio-demographic variables evolve in a stable manner over time and a well-
designed credit scoring model based on socio-demographic and behavioral variables 
might improve the performance of models employing financial characteristics. 
Following the above arguments we construct two types of credit scoring model, one 
based on logistic regression and the other on Classification and Regression Trees 
(CART). Then we test our models on a large and unique retail loan dataset. Based on out-
of-sample testing we compare the efficiency of the two methods and identify the key 
determinants of default behavior. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to provide 
this type of analysis performed on real retail banking data in a post-transformation 
country that is now part of the EU. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data 
used in the estimation process. Section 3 describes the two methodologies used and the 
empirical results. In Section 4 we compare the performance of the two methods and 
Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
The dataset employed in our analysis was provided by a bank that specializes in 
providing small- and medium-sized loans to retail clientele in the area of real property 
purchase and reconstruction.2 The same data have been used for the bank’s own 
assessment and scoring modeling. The dataset contains various socio-demographic 
characteristics and other information collected by the bank on 3,403 individual clients 
who were granted loans during 1999–2006. The observation period ends in 2007. 1,695 
clients in the dataset defaulted on loans and 1,708 performed well, i.e. the sample is 
artificially balanced to have approximately 50% defaults. This data arrangement is in line 
with Thomas et al. (2002), who suggest splitting the sample 50:50 between good and bad 
loans. Splitting the sample is done due to the fact that keeping the same odds in the 
4sample as in the whole population would likely result in not enough bad observations in 
the subpopulation to identify their characteristics in assessing key determinants of 
default.
The loans are evenly distributed during the analyzed period. There is no 
concentration of defaults in any period. The definition of default (and consequently of the 
good/bad variables) follows the Bank for International Settlement standard: a client is in 
default if he/she is more than 90 days overdue with any payment connected with the loan.  
For all clients we have a number of variables that we present in Table 1 along 
with the variable definitions and whether they are categorized or continuous. The first 
part of the characteristics are socio-demographic variables and they characterize the client 
at the moment of loan application. Among others, there are several categorized variables 
related to the client’s employment situation. The bank does not record information about 
the client’s income and expenditures; instead the bank calculates and records the relevant 
credit ratios. The first ratio is the percentage of income that is spent on expenditures 
(Credit Ratio 1). The second ratio is the ratio of the client’s available income to the 
official minimum wage valid at the time of the loan application (Credit Ratio 2).
The other part of the variables characterizes the relationship between the client and 
the bank. The Own Resources variable is the amount of resources the client declares to 
have at the time of loan application available to use for the purpose defined in the 
Purpose of Loan variable. For example, it can be the amount of money a client can 
allocate as a down payment for the purchase of an apartment. The Length of Relationship 
variable is the number of years between the time a client opened an account with the bank 
and the loan was granted. 
The variable labeled Deposit Behavior is a variable constructed by the bank and 
describes the client’s behavior on his or her own current account. It quantifies the 
frequency at which the client deposits money into the account as well as whether the 
deposits follow a regular pattern. Hence, the Deposit Behavior variable depends on the 
amount of a client’s savings as well as on how regular saving deposits are made. The 
Loan Protection variable records the credit risk protection used, i.e. whether collateral, a 
guarantor or another type of mitigation was used. Finally, our data sample contains 
information about borrowers who were eventually granted loans and does not contain 
information on rejected applicants, i.e. clients who applied for credit but were rejected, as 
the bank did not collect this data. This is a common problem in the literature (see Green, 
51998, for a sample selection bias discussion) and involves a “reject inference” process, 
i.e. a process of attempting to infer the true creditworthiness status of rejected applicants. 
Since the true creditworthiness status of the rejected applicants is unknown and their 
characteristics might differ from those who were granted a loan, this implies that for a 
given set of attributes, those individuals who were granted a loan are by the nature of 
selection less likely to default than similar individuals chosen randomly from the whole 
population (which is a mixture of both types of individuals: those who were and who 
were not granted credit). Thus, the unconditional model would yield a downward biased 
estimate of the default probability for individuals randomly chosen from the whole 
population. However, potential bias due to the reject inference does not pose a critical 
obstacle as our main interest is not in estimating the default probability but in analyzing 
the key default drivers. Therefore, we assume that other potential borrowers have similar 
characteristics as those in the database. In this assumption we follow the approach of 
Banasik, Crook, and Thomas (2003), who compared the classification accuracy of a 
model based only on accepted applicants relative to one based on a sample of all 
applicants, and found only a minimal difference. Further, Hand and Henley (1993) 
analyzed a “reject inference” process and concluded that a reliable rejection inference is 
impossible and improvements in scoring models achieved by reject inference are based 
on luck, the use of additional information (for example using expert skill), or ad hoc 
adjustments of the rules in a direction likely to lead to a reduced bias. 
3. Estimation techniques and empirical results 
We employ two distinct techniques for credit scoring: a parametric approach with logistic 
regression and a non-parametric Classification and Regression Trees (CART) model, 
described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. However, before the estimation stage we 
categorize variables and compute their “information values” to eliminate variables that 
have no discriminating power. 
We categorize continuous variables as recommended in Thomas et al. (2002) and 
this way we account for potential nonlinearity in risk because treating variables as 
continuous explicitly assumes monotonic risk. First, the range of values for each 
continuous variable was split into ten categories according to the principle that all 
categories should have the same number of observations. Second, odds ratios and 
information values were calculated for each category and categories with similar values 
6were merged. This step was also performed for the categorized variables. The overall 
information value (IV) of a variable is the sum of the information values for each 
category of variable that is defined as ?
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Defaulted and Good have the total number of defaulted and non-defaulted observations 
and both Defaultedi and Goodi have the number of defaulted and non-defaulted clients in 
the ith category of a variable. An odds ratio equal to 1 implies that the variable has no 
power to discriminate between defaulted and non-defaulted clients. Finally, the 
information value gives the predictive power of the variable. Specifically, variables with 
higher IV have higher power to discriminate between bad and good clients (see Hand and 
Henley, 1997). Hence, variables with the lowest information values were omitted from 
estimation. 
The total information values for the variables can be found in Table 2. The most 
significant variables are those that characterize the relationship between the client and the 
bank, a finding that is in accord with the comprehensive overview in Anderson (2007). 
The variables that characterize the loan protection and credit quality of the debtor (i.e. 
both credit ratios) are almost insignificant. This fact is surprising especially in the case of 
loan protection as one would expect that collateral in the form of real estate would be an 
effective predictor of good performance. However, this detail can be explained by the fact 
that the amount of each loan in the data sample is not excessively large and therefore 
even a defaulted loan does not necessarily result in a loss of property. 
It is also interesting that, based on their information value, most of the socio-
demographic variables are not good determinants of default. Only Education is a very 
strong default predictor since clients with a higher level of education show much less 
default than other clients. Marital Status, Region, Sex, and Employment Position have 
low information values.3 Another interesting factor is the difference in the information 
value of both credit ratios. It seems that the default behavior of clients does not depend on 
the absolute amount of “savings” (i.e. the difference between income and expenditures) 
7but on relative income (i.e. the ratio of expenditures to income). That means that high 
income clients with high expenditures can be risky. 
3.1 Logistic regression 
The use of logistic (or logit) regression in credit scoring is well established in the 
literature, which also shows that logistic regression is usually very successful in 
determining low and high risk loans in tasks similar to ours (e.g. Lawrence and Arshadi, 
1995; Hand and Henley, 1997; or Charitou, Neophytou, and Charalambous, 2004). 
 In our analysis we decided to employ all variables with an information value 
higher than 0.1. The reason for such a low threshold is to begin by employing more 
variables available for the logistic regression and also to have more socio-demographic 
variables, despite the fact that in our case these tend to exhibit lower information values. 
We employed forward-backward stepwise model selection using Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) to select the best model. The selection of variables in the final model is 
thus based mainly on a sequence of statistical tests, an approach that is plausible within 
the confines of credit score modeling. Most variables we use in the final models are 
frequently employed in theoretically based consumer behavior models and in the credit 
scoring literature (see Avery et al., 2004). Finally, the economic relevance of the 
estimated coefficients is assessed in analyses in this paper and supported by the literature. 
 In order to evaluate the performance of our models we follow a strategy to 
partition our dataset into two samples: one for development purposes (development 
sample) and one for validation purposes (validation sample). The dataset was randomly 
split such that the development sample contains two-thirds of the observations (2280 
observations) and the validation sample contains one-third of the observations (1143 
observations). The validation sample is used to test the discriminatory power of the 
model on a sample that was not used in the development stage of the model (out-of-
sample testing). 
 Initially we specify the logistic regression. Given a vector of application 
characteristics x, the probability of default p is related to vector x by the relationship 
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8where coefficients wi represent the importance of specific loan application characteristic 
coefficients xi in the logistic regression. Coefficients wi are obtained by using maximum 
likelihood estimation.  
 Using this method we first estimate Model 1, which is the output of the stepwise 
procedure. The estimates are presented in Table 3. This model has several drawbacks. 
First, there are variables that have insignificant coefficients. Second, due to the high 
number of categories and variables, the model also has a high number of degrees of 
freedom, a property that can lead to serious over-fitting. 
 In Model 2 we eliminate variables with insignificant coefficients (the following 
variables were dropped: Sector of Employment, Years of Employment, and Purpose of 
Loan). The results are presented in Table 3. The elimination of several variables is 
justified also by the fact that the decrease in the AIC was very slow for the last variables 
that entered the model. In Model 2 the value of the AIC increased only by about 2% and 
also the properties of the coefficients are similar to those in Model 1. Thus, Model 2 is 
able to discriminate among clients at a similar level as Model 1 but with fewer variables. 
 Finally, we estimate Model 3 in which we eliminate a very strong default 
predictor: the variable Own Resources. The reason is that the amount of a client’s 
resources is usually hard to detect, especially if the client is not required to declare her/his 
other funds outside the bank providing the loan. Therefore it is of interest to see whether 
it is possible to discriminate successfully without the knowledge of what funds the 
customer has. Model 3 is constructed using the same list of variables as Model 1 but the 
variable Own Resources is omitted. The coefficients of this model are presented in Table 
3 and reveal that Model 3 is able to successfully discriminate among clients without 
knowledge of the client’s resources. 
 In order to compare the quality of our three models we employ the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and the area under the ROC curve denoted as the 
AUC (see Blöchlinger and Leippold, 2006 for extensive details). Webb (2002) defines 
the ROC as the plot of the true positive rate on the vertical axis against the false positive 
rate on the horizontal axis. Hence, movement along the ROC curve represents trading off 
false positive cases for false negative cases. Any ROC curve passes through the (0,0) and 
(1,1) points and as the separation increases the curve moves into the top left corner. The 
ideal model should perform 100% detection and have a 0% false positive rate. The ROC 
curve in the case of the ideal model is characterized by a kinked curve passing through 
9the coordinates (0,0)-(0,1)-(1,1). Different models produce different ROC curve shapes 
that characterize the performance of each particular model. A comparison of the 
performance is enabled by computing the area under the curve (AUC) that measures the 
accuracy of the model. From the description of the ROC curve it follows that the ideal 
model has an AUC=1.4
 We plot the ROC curves on a single graph (Figure 1) so that a comparison of the 
empirical ROC curves resulting from the three logistic regression models is readily 
available.5 Consequently, we present the AUC values derived from the ROC curves in 
Table 4. We can see that the shapes of the ROC are very similar for Models 1 and 2. They 
are also very close in terms of the derived values of the AUC: Model 1 has AUC=0.877 
and Model 2 has AUC=0.864, which is a difference of a mere 1.49%. That means that 
both models have very similar characteristics and are able to discriminate with almost the 
same power. Therefore Model 2 is preferred over Model 1 due to the principle of 
parsimony. Model 3 has a much higher value of AIC, but more importantly the value of 
the AUC coefficient (AUC=0.832) is only marginally worse than that of Model 1 or 2. 
The consequences of this are striking: we do not need to know the variable Own 
Resources to construct a model with very similar power to a model containing this 
variable. This offers for example the possibility for a bank to check for misinformation or 
potential fraud by running two different scoring functions: one which accounts for the 
declared resources the customer owns and one that does not. If there are serious 
differences in the results, it might be worth examining the applicant further. 
 Another test of the power of a model is out-of-sample testing, i.e. the testing of 
the discriminatory power of the model on a sample that was not used in the development 
stage of the model, as we note in Section 1.1. In Table 4 we present the AUC values for 
all three models. It is possible to see that all models have similar power for both 
development and validation samples. As expected, Model 3 has lower power because the 
most important variable is left out. The approximately 11% loss of power does not seem 
that large in view of its great ability to discriminate in the absence of the single most 
important variable. 
 We also tested both constrained models (Models 2 and 3) versus Model 1 using 
the log-likelihood ratio test (LR test) instead of a standard F-test as the response variable 
is not normally distributed. The LR test statistics has approximately a Chi-square 
distribution with n degrees of freedom (d.f.), where n is the number of constraints. The 
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null hypothesis is that the omitted variables are non-significant, i.e. their coefficients are 
equal to zero. The residual deviances for all three models are: DEV1=2013.015, 
DEV2=2104.823, and DEV3=2358.410. This means that when comparing Model 1 with 
Model 2 the test statistics is LR12=91.808 (23 d.f.), and the statistics comparing Model 1 
with Model 3 is LR13=345.395 (17 d.f.).
6 The values are highly statistically significant, 
implying that we should reject the null hypothesis of the non-significance of the omitted 
variables. This is a sign that the omitted variables have statistical significance; however, 
the power of all of the models is approximately the same. We conclude that all three 
models can be used for credit scoring. However, because of the high number of 
categories there is the risk connected with the possible over-fitting of Model 1. Therefore, 
we lean towards Models 2 and 3. The final choice of model should be based on other 
criteria dictated by special needs such as the results of the out-of-sample back-testing of 
models, requirements for model parsimony and data availability. Further, we also plot the 
out-of-sample ROC curves for all three models in Figure 1.7
3.2 Results of the logistic regression
In both Model 1 and Model 2 we observe an inverse relationship between the amount of 
client’s Own Resources and the probability of default. Since we model the probability of 
default, a higher score reflects a higher default probability. The values of coefficients are 
economically relevant as they show that clients with more funds (and lower coefficient 
value), whose key source is a client’s income, show a lower default risk. This feature was 
first shown by Sexton (1977) and is also directly supported by the evidence from 
emerging markets (see Arslan and Karan, 2010). 
The variable Amount of Loan offers interesting findings because of the change in 
the coefficient’s sign for different models. Models 1 and 2, which contain the Own 
Resources variable, show that small loans (with higher coefficient values) appear to be 
more risky. On the contrary, when excluding the Own Resources variable as in Model 3, 
large loans become more risky. The explanation may be that when the client owns a low 
amount of resources both small and large loans are risky. When we account for the 
client’s own resources, we identify a second group of loans (i.e. large loans with the 
client owning a low amount of resources) and the regression is then able to distinguish 
small (more risky) loans. However, if we do not have this information, the regression 
identifies the larger loans as more risky. 
11
 The variable Purpose of Loan captures the effect of whether the loan is to be used 
for new construction or renovation of a standing housing facility. The higher the 
coefficient is, the greater the probability of default. In our estimation the highest 
coefficient is recorded for the renovation category. This means that loans for renovation 
are in general more risky than those for real estate purchases. The likely reason for this is 
that the decision to purchase a house or apartment is made mostly by people with more 
potential to repay their loans as compared to those who decide to renovate. 
 Another strong predictor is Education Level, which shows that clients with a 
higher level of education (and lower coefficient value) have much less difficulty paying 
their debts, a result confirmed by the literature. Further relevant results can be drawn 
from the coefficient values: clients with only general secondary education are riskier than 
those with vocational education at the secondary level who have passed a graduation 
examination. The reason is that secondary school graduates are often not accepted for 
university education. People without vocational or university education have a harder 
time getting a better-paid job. They are also more likely to fail to find permanent 
employment and to become unemployed, and thus they more often fall into the lowest 
income category. 
 The Length of the Relationship between the client and the bank is the most 
important behavioral characteristic. The results show that clients with accounts opened in 
the previous few years (and higher coefficient values) are riskier than those with a longer 
relationship with a bank (and lower coefficient values). This finding is in line with the 
evidence from the empirical literature (Thomas, Ho, and Scherer, 2001; Anderson, 2007) 
showing a positive correlation between the length of time the client has had an account 
with the bank and her/his ability to repay the debt. This is because the bank knows clients 
with longer histories better than those with shorter histories, and therefore the bank can 
better foresee that the former group of clients will not default. 
Marital status showed to be a relatively strong predictor of default in all the 
models. We conjecture that clients without a spouse (and quite high coefficient values) 
may be considered by banks as riskier than married clients who take responsibility for a 
partner and perhaps also a family. Further, married clients may be considered less risky 
also because they usually have dual income available. The remaining variables that were 
selected into the models include Deposit Behavior, Date of Account Opening, Sector of 
12
Employment and Years of Employment. These variables have low information value, 
though.
Our assessment shows that logistic regression can be very successful in creating a 
powerful model for credit scoring and it is able to capture various features specific to 
emerging market economies. It is also able to detect the variables with the most 
discriminating power and combine them so that the bank can detect default behavior in 
multiple ways that are also partially exclusive.
3. 2 CART analysis and results 
In this section we provide another analysis of the default behavior of retail clients, using 
Classification and Regression Trees (CART). The theory behind CART analysis and 
some of its applications as a discrimination tool, or pattern recognition technique, can be 
found in Breiman et al. (1984) or Webb (2002). The method has been shown to be very 
competitive with parametric tools such as logistic regression (see Feldman and Gross, 
2005 or Lee et al., 2006). The advantage of CART in credit scoring is that it is very 
intuitive, easy to explain to management, and able to deal with missing observations. 
The CART tree is a non-parametric approach and consists of several layers of 
nodes: the first layer consists of a root node and the last layer consists of leaf nodes. 
Because it is a binary tree, each node (except the leaf nodes) is connected to two nodes in 
the next layer. The root node contains the entire training set; the other nodes contain 
subsets of the training set. At each node, the subset is divided into two disjoint groups, 
based on one specific characteristic xi from the measurement vector. The split into two 
groups is defined by the following inequality: if xi is an ordinal variable, then the split 
occurs when xi > t for some constant t that characterizes a splitting rule. It follows that an 
individual j is classified into the right node if the previous statement is true; if not, the 
individual j is classified into the left node. A similar rule applies when xi is a categorized 
variable.
The characteristic xi and the constant t are chosen to minimize the diversity of the 
resulting sub-samples. The classification process is a recursive procedure that starts at the 
root node. Then at each further node (with the exception of leaf nodes) one single 
characteristic and a splitting rule are selected. First, the best split is found for each 
characteristic. Then, among these characteristics the one with the best split is chosen. 
This procedure is replicated until the resulting samples are not homogenous enough. As 
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the trees often become quite large they are simplified (pruned) so that the classification 
error in the pruned tree equals to that in the original tree. 
In Figure 2 we present the optimal tree obtained after the pruning procedure that 
was constructed by using the same short list of variables as in the subsection 3.1. In each 
node we present the classification rule and the value of characteristic x, which is the basis 
for the decision.  
In order to further assess the results of the CART methodology we inspect the 
plots of the ROC curves (yielding the AUC coefficients) in Figure 1, introduced earlier in 
Section 3.1. The ROC curve plots are of comparable qualities, as are the associated 
derived AUC coefficients. The AUC coefficient for the development sample (Figure 1) is 
0.830 and for the validation sample it is 0.815. These results, combined with the 
comparison of the CART and logistic regression ROC curve plots in both figures, serve 
as evidence that the CART methodology can also be very successful in discriminating 
between default and non-default behavior. Thus, it can be used successfully for credit 
scoring decisions. Another very useful feature of CART is the possibility of its use for 
sensitivity analysis with respect to different variables. In this respect Own Resources, 
Education, Length of Relationship, Purpose of Loan and Amount of Loan were identified 
as the most important variables. These variables play a role at the top nodes and they are 
identical to those identified by parametric regression. Thus, CART confirmed the variable 
selection of the logistic regression in the previous subsection. 
According to the tree, strong default behavior is connected with the client owning 
a small amount of resources and having a low level of education. Non-default behavior is 
linked with the client owning a high amount of resources and having a long-standing 
relationship with the bank. Both of these predictions are in accord with the selection by 
logistic regression in the previous subsection.8
4. Comparison of the performance of the two methods 
In order to compare the performance of the two different methods used in the analysis, 
we perform a formal statistical comparison. We perform the bootstrapping-based method 
known as cross-validation described by Hand and Henley (1997) as an example of the use 
of cross-validation techniques in credit scoring analysis. We follow the approach of 
Desay, Crook, and Overstreet (1996) and construct confidence intervals for the AUC
coefficients for all estimated models using cross-validation based on an out-of-sample 
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stability test that measures the sensitivity of the scoring function parameter estimation to 
the structure of the development sample. 
Specifically, we randomly split our dataset into development and validation 
subsets. For each of the four estimated models, we estimate the coefficients of the models 
(or decision trees) using the development subset and test it using the validation subset, i.e. 
we assess the predictive accuracy of models using the validation data. We repeat this 
procedure 1000 times and using the estimated values of AUC for each repetition we 
construct the confidence intervals for the AUC coefficient for all models. The resulting 
confidence intervals can be subsequently used to test the hypothesis that pairs of 
estimated models have different predictive power (i.e. whether the respective intervals are 
disjointed). In Table 4 we report 95% confidence-level intervals. Based on these values 
we reject the hypothesis that our models have different predictive power (e.g. the 
confidence intervals are not disjointed). In other words, we find that our models do not 
significantly differ in terms of their predictive power and that they have very similar 
performance. 
5. Conclusions 
We assess consumer credit risk in the context of European emerging markets where credit 
to the private sector has risen rapidly with a particularly strong segment of primarily 
mortgage-based housing loans. The evaluation of the credit conditions of the borrowers in 
the new EU member countries has been largely neglected, the issue of credit scoring is 
grossly under-researched in these emerging markets, and credit scoring empirical studies 
are missing. 
In our paper we construct two types of credit risk models based on logistic 
regression and Classification and Regression Trees (CART). We employ a large retail-
loan banking dataset from the Czech Republic, a new EU member. The set that is rich in 
financial, socio-demographic, and behavioral variables. We compare the efficiency of the 
two methods and identify the key determinants of default behavior. The most important 
financial and behavioral characteristics of default behavior detected are the amount of 
resources a client owns, the level of education, marital status, the purpose of the loan, and 
the years of having an account with the bank. An important contribution is that with the 
logistic regression model we identified a specification that does not contain the single 
most important financial variable (the amount of resources a client owns) but still 
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performs only marginally worse than the specification with this variable. This finding 
allows a bank to assess the creditworthiness of a client even when a client might produce 
inaccurate or false documents on the amount of resources owned. Further, both methods 
validated similar variables as determinants. Hence, both methods are robust and can be 
used to construct credit scoring models interchangeably or complementarily. 
In the new EU members prudential financial market regulation policies and 
keeping credit growth in check are important for future entry to the Euro area. Gabrish 
and Orlowski (2010) argue that convergence to the Eurozone requires is to be based on 
dynamic trends reflecting advances in the candidate country’s financial system stability 
and the low risk environment. Financial market regulation policies are also important for 
further financial deepening of the new EU economies (Backé and Wójcik, 2008), as well 
as to deal with the weak convergence on the corporate level (Gallizo et. al., 2010). Our 
analysis of default determinants is thus important as, to the best of our knowledge, we are 
the first to provide a credit scoring analysis performed on real retail banking data in a 
post-transformation country that is now part of the EU. 
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Endnotes:
1. Hand and Henley (1997) provide a survey of the statistical techniques used in the 
process of building a credit scoring model. Vojtek and Ko?enda (2006) review most 
frequently employed credit scoring methods. 
2. The bank does not wish to be explicitly identified and we honor this request as 
specified in the contract to obtain the data. 
3. The low information value of the Sex variable is in contrast to the finding in Dinh and 
Kleimeier (2007), where Sex/Gender was found to have good predictive power. The 
micro finance literature suggests that women repay more reliably. The low information 
value of the Sex variable also hints at non-discriminatory practices. 
4. The choice of the model in practice does not always depend only on the ROC curve 
and the AUC. It may be important to look at the Type I error (accepting a bad loan as a 
good loan) and the Type II error (rejecting a good loan as a bad loan). It is a generally 
accepted fact that the misclassification costs of a Type I error are much higher than those 
of a Type II error. For a Type I error the lender may lose the whole amount of the loan 
and its interest while for a Type II error the lender loses only the expected profit from the 
loan. Therefore it might be important to look at the full curve, not only at the AUC. In 
banking practice therefore the choice of model might be based on minimizing 
misclassification costs. 
5. In Figure 1 we also plot the empirical ROC curve from the Classification and 
Regression Trees (CART) methodology, whose results are presented in Section 3.2. 
6. Such a high number of degrees of freedom is implied by the fact that each class of 
categorized variable adds one degree of freedom. Critical values at 1% are 41.638 and 
33.409 for 23 and 17 degrees of freedom, respectively. 
7. A comparison of the out-of-sample ROC curves yields a similar outcome as the case of 
empirical ROC curves. Model 1 (AUC=0.869) and Model 2 (AUC=0.855) perform at a 
qualitatively similar level and Model 3 (AUC=0.814) lags only marginally behind. 
8. We also estimated a tree analogical to Model 3, i.e. the tree without the most 
significant variable Own Resources. The power of this specification is lower than that of 
all models we were able to estimate. The value of the AUC coefficient is 0.804. It seems 
that for the non-parametric approach it is important to include the most significant 
variables. The reason is due to the CART methodology design: in the highest nodes the 
largest increase in the efficiency of CART occurs when using these very significant 
variables. Despite the lower performance, the CART without the Own Resources variable 
does not constitute a complete failure. 
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Table 1: Variable definitions 
Default  Defaulted or not defaulted client 
Socio-demographic variables
Education c The highest attained education of client, categorized variable 
Marital status c Status of the client, single/married, categorized variable 
Years of employment  The number of years in the current employment 
Sector of employment c The sector in which the client is employed, categorized variable 
Sex c Sex of the client, categorized variable 
Date of Birth  Date of birth of client 
Type of employment c Type of client’s employment, categorized variable 
Number of employments  The total number of employments in the last 3 years 
Employment position c The position of client in employment, categorized variable 
Credit ratio 1  Ratio of Expenditures/Income of client 
Credit ratio 2  Ratio of (Income-Expenditure)/Living Wage of client 
Region  Post Code of region of client’s address 
Bank-client relationship variables
Own resources  Declared own resources, in percentage of total amount needed 
Amount of loan  The total amount of loan granted 
Purpose of loan c The declared purpose of loan, categorized variable 
Length of the 
Relationship 
The length of client/bank relationship at the time of loan 
application 
Date of account opening  The year when client opened an account in the bank 
Deposit Behavior The characteristics of client’s behavior with respect to her/his 
current account 
Loan Protection  c The type of credit risk mitigation, categorized variable 
Type of product  c Type of product - loan  
Number of co-signers   The number of co-signers for the current loan  
Date of loan  The year in which the loan was granted 
Note : “c” denotes categorized variables. 
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Table 2: Information values for variables 
Own Resources 1.462 
Date of account opening 0.631 
Length of the Relationship 0.601 
Deposit Behavior 0.502 
Education 0.359 
Purpose of loan 0.279 
Years of employment 0.136 
Sector of employment 0.188 
Credit ratio 1 0.175 
Number of co-signers 0.131 
Amount of loan 0.123 
Marital status 0.112 
Region 0.093 
Employment position 0.063 
Type of employment 0.055 
Credit ratio 2 0.052 
Date of Birth 0.047 
Sex 0.039 
Loan Protection 0.036 
Type of product 0.022 
Number of employments 0.021 
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Table 3 Coefficients for Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3. 
t-values in parenthesis, A, B, and C denote statistical significance of coefficient at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
 Value Coefficient 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  3.78 4.56 -0.59 
  (5.87)A (8.94)A (-1.23) 
Own recourses 0.00+ thru 0.05 reference value reference value  
 0.05+ thru 0.33 -1.54 -1.51  
  (-4.72)A (-4.73)A
 0.33+ thru 0.36 -2.29 -2.30  
  (-6.83)A (-6.99)A
 0.36+ thru 0.39 -2.87 -2.93  
  (-8.10)A (-8.48)A
 0.39+ thru 0.50 -4.02 -4.19  
  (-11.47)A (-12.20)A
 0.50+ thru 1.52 -4.64 -4.85  
  (-12.61)A (-13.44)A
Amount of loan 2489+ thru 50000 reference value reference value reference value 
 50000+ thru 69000 0.19 0.30 0.03 
  (0.73) (1.14) (0.12) 
 69000+ thru 100000 0.08 0.23 -0.01 
  (0.44) (1.21) (-0.06) 
 100000+ thru 200000 -0.40 -0.38 -0.08 
  (-2.01)B (-2.00)B (-0.47) 
 200000+ thru 250000 -0.22 -0.27 0.48 
  (-0.95) (-1.21) (2.34)B
 250000+ thru 1500000 -0.08 -0.09 0.54 
  (-0.40) (-0.47) (2.94)A
Purpose of loan Building a house reference value  reference value 
 Purchase of Apartment 0.57  0.84 
  (1.59)  (2.43)B
 Purchase of Land 0.68  0.81 
  (1.02)  (1.43) 
 Purchase of House 0.51  0.81B
  (1.35)  (2.24) 
 Renovation 0.99  1.54 
  (2.91)A  (4.68)A
 Rest 0.07  0.35 
  (0.19)  (1.01) 
 N/A 0.27  0.40 
  (0.66)  (1.01) 
Education (Ed.) Elementary reference value reference value reference value 
See Note at the 
end.
Vocational Ed. 0.13 0.04 0.07 
  (0.52) (0.18) (0.30) 
 Vocational Ed. with 
Leaving Exam 
-1.27 -1.34 -1.40 
  (-4.21)A (-4.72)A (-5.26)A
 Secondary Ed. -0.55 -0.80 -0.85 
  (-2.01)B (-3.11)A (-3.55)A
 Higher Secondary Ed. -1.17 -1.58 -1.47 
  (-1.60) (-2.26)B (-2.11)B
22
 University Ed. -1.44 -1.76 -1.64 
  (-4.12)A (-5.36)A (-5.33)A
Length of the 
Relationship
N/A reference value reference value reference value 
 0 0.67 0.84 -0.29 
  (2.21)B (2.88)A (-1.11) 
 0.00+ thru 1 0.32 0.42 -0.29 
  (1.05) (1.43) (-1.09) 
 1.00+ thru 3 -1.09 -0.91 -1.08 
  (-3.90)A (-3.40)A (-4.41)A
 3.00+ thru 5 -1.63 -1.55 -1.34 
  (-6.16)A (-6.05)A (-5.58)A
 5.00+ thru 10 -1.68 -1.63 -0.76 
  (-5.34)A (-5.34)A (-2.83)A
Marital Status Married reference value reference value reference value 
 Single 0.45 0.43 0.50 
  (3.93)A (3.88)A (4.76)A
Date of account 
opening 
1993-1995 reference value reference value reference value 
 1996-1997 0.21 0.10 0.55 
  (0.82) (0.40) (2.37)B
 1998-1999 -0.17 -0.31 0.66 
  (-0.58) (-1.06) (2.48)B
 2000 -0.45 -0.62 0.71 
  (-1.20) (-1.71)C (2.14)B
 2001 -1.23 -1.43 0.55 
  (-3.08)A (-3.72)A (1.59) 
 2001-2004 -1.84 -2.00 1.14 
  (-4.23)A (-4.76)A (3.25)A
Deposit
Behavior
0.0+ thru 1.0 reference value reference value reference value 
 1.0+ thru 28.0 -0.51 -0.51 -0.71 
  (-2.53)B (-2.60)A (-4.02)A
 28.0+ thru 363.0 -0.18 -0.25 -0.82 
  (-1.25) (-1.75)C (-6.25)A
 363.0+ thru 1401.0 0.01 -0.02 -0.87 
  (0.08) (-0.11) (-5.14)A
Years of 
employment 
0+ thru 4 reference value  reference value 
 4+ thru 5 0.31  0.25 
  (1.55)  (1.41) 
 5+ thru 6 -0.07  0.02 
  (-0.32)  (0.10) 
 6+ thru 9 -0.06  -0.12 
  (-0.38)  (-0.88) 
 9+ thru 14 -0.18  -0.26 
  (-1.00)  (-1.65)C
 14+ thru 60 -0.90  -0.89 
  (-3.96)A  (-4.49)A
Sector of 
employment 
Building Industry reference value   
 Mining 0.75   
  (1.30)   
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 Education -0.68   
  (-1.66)   
 Energy- and Water-
supply 
-0.40   
  (-0.81)   
 Financial Services -1.08   
  (-1.88)C   
 Gastronomy and 
Lodging 
0.23   
  (0.66)   
 Health Service -0.14   
  (-0.39)   
 Trade 0.08   
  (0.35)   
 Agriculture and 
Forestry
0.07   
  (0.19)   
 Communications -0.28   
  (-0.98)   
 N/A -0.69   
  (-1.87)C   
 Other Business 0.34   
  (1.37)   
 Public Service -0.32   
  (-1.42)   
Note: AIC  2119.02 2164.82 2430.41 
Note: Vocational education (career and technical education) prepares students for specific manual or 
practical careers. Secondary-level vocational education may end with a demanding graduation examination, 
and having passed such an exam indicates a higher level of achievement than graduating without passing an 
exam. 
Table 4: Stability and performance of the models 
    Development  Validation  
95% significance 
interval for AUC  
Model 1 AUC 0.877 0.869 (0.825; 0.896) 
       
Model 2 AUC 0.864 0.855 (0.816; 0.879) 
       
Model 3 AUC 0.832 0.814 (0.785;0.849) 
       
Model Tree AUC 0.830 0.815 (0.778;0.856) 
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Note: Comparison of the different models is done by employing the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC curve plots the true positive 
rate on the vertical axis against the false positive rate on the horizontal axis. Movement along the ROC curve represents trading off false positive cases for 
false negative cases. Any ROC curve passes through the (0,0) and (1,1) points and as the separation increases the curve moves into the top left corner. The 
ideal model with 100% correct detection rate would have the kinked ROC curve passing through the coordinates (0,0)-(0,1)-(1,1). Due to differences in ROC 
shapes comparison of the performance of different models is enabled by computing the area under the ROC curve denoted as the AUC. From the description 
of the ROC it follows that the ideal model has the AUC=1.
Figure 1: ROC curves for the development sample (left) and the validation sample (right).
Note: in each finite node we state its classification with the percentage of successfully classified observations
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Figure 2: Model Tree
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